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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 07-1102
                    
ROBERT ALVAREZ, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED,
                                      Appellant
v.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA; CIGNA
CORPORATION, d/b/a CIGNA GROUP INSURANCE
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-04326)
District Judge:  The Honorable Stewart Dalzell
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 14, 2008
                    
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 11, 2008 )
                    
OPINION
                    
  CIGNA filed a motion to quash the summons on the grounds that it is not an insurance1
company and had no stake in the policy.  The District Court denied the motion as moot
after dismissing Alvarez’s complaint.  We will refer only to INA as the insurer.  
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BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellant, Robert Alvarez, appeals the December 12, 2006 order of the District
Court dismissing his complaint.  We will affirm. 
I.
Alvarez purchased, effective April 1, 1992, long term care (“LTC”) insurance from
the Insurance Company of North America (“INA”), a subsidiary of CIGNA Corporation
(“CIGNA”), which had been selling LTC insurance since 1988.   Under the master policy1
issued by INA, “[p]remiums are subject to change at any time after payment of the first
premium” and, in addition to state area rating classifications, “[r]ates are based on
attained age on date of issue and this base does not change with age.”  (App. 89.)  As a
result, the premiums vary from individual to individual.  A rider to the master policy
includes a provision with the heading, “Guaranteed Renewable,” which provides that
“[a]n insured’s coverage will automatically be renewed provided the required premium is
paid and benefits have not been exhausted.”  (App. 106.)  Prior to the time when Alvarez
purchased his policy, he received promotional materials, which provided,
 [y]our coverage will stay in effect as long as you continue to pay
premiums.  The Company cannot terminate your coverage for any other
reason.  Your premiums are based on your age at the time of purchase and
will not be adjusted unless the Company increases rates for the class as a
group.
   Similar statements about premium increases and descriptions of the Guaranteed2
Renewable provision are also found on Alvarez’s application form and certificate.  
  This is an 80% increase.  INA points out that this is an average annual increase of3
5.02% on a compound basis over the twelve year period prior to the increase.  INA also
indicated that it intended to increase the premium by another 80% in the next two years.  
  This action was originally brought in the United States District Court for the District of4
Columbia and, on August 21, 2006, was transferred to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.  
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(App. 122.)   The promotional materials described INA as “rated ‘A’ (Excellent) by A.M.2
Best, an independent insurance rating service.”  (App. 125.) 
Later in 1992, INA ceased writing coverage under the master policy, an act known
as “closing the block,” thus capping the pool of insureds from which to support future
claims.  Alvarez’s 1992 annual premium was $1,188, and was raised for the first time in
2004, increasing to $2,138.       3
Alvarez filed claims for actual fraud, constructive fraud, unlawful trade practices
under the District of Columbia’s Consumer Protection Procedure Act (“DCCPPA”),
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and punitive damages on
behalf of himself and a class of other purchasers of LTC insurance underwritten by INA.  4
The District Court dismissed the contract and punitive damage claims because there was a
clear contractual right to raise premiums, and because INA could not violate an implied
covenant by exercising an explicitly reserved right.  After requesting supplemental
briefing on the issue of whether INA had a duty under District of Columbia law to
disclose future premium increases, the Court dismissed the fraud claim, finding that INA
4had no such duty.  The Court rejected Alvarez’s claim of constructive fraud because no
relationship of trust or confidence existed between the parties at the time INA allegedly
fraudulently induced Alvarez to enter into the relationship.  Finally, the Court dismissed
Alvarez’s claim under the DCCPPA because the same legal standard that applied to the
fraud claim applied to it.    
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  We
exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a motion to
dismiss is plenary.  Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  We must
accept as true all allegations of the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Jordan v. Fox,
Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).  A court “need not
credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to
dismiss.”  Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).  The
District Court found, and the parties agree, that the substantive law of the District of
Columbia applies.   
III.
Alvarez argues, first, that INA made false representations to him on his purchase
and on each renewal of his policy by omitting that (1) the policy was initially
underpriced, (2) the actuarial assumptions and lapse rates were unsound, (3) the original
premium would not be sufficient to support future claims, (4) it planned on seeking a
  Alvarez also argues that the District Court considered additional information not5
contained in the pleadings and that the motion should have been converted into a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  INA
submitted the master insurance policy, promotional materials, and an affidavit
establishing the right to raise premiums.  These materials were integral to, and were
specifically relied upon in, the complaint.  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
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series of premium increases, (5) closing the LTC block would lead to financial losses, (6)
it intended to raise premiums to exorbitant rates to obtain windfall profits by forcing
insureds to drop the policy thereby avoiding future claims, and (7) it intended to pass any
risk of loss due to the defective underpricing of the policy to him in the form of higher
premiums.     5
 To establish a fraud claim, a plaintiff must show, by clear and convincing
evidence, “(1) a false representation, (2) in reference to [a] material fact, (3) made with
knowledge of its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) action is taken in reliance
upon the representation.”  Bennett v. Kiggins, 377 A.2d 57, 59 (D.C. 1977).  Although
the elements of fraud must be pleaded with particularity, intent may be alleged generally. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  A party must allege facts “which will enable the court to draw an
inference of fraud,” and allegations in the form of conclusions or impermissible
speculation as to the existence of fraud are insufficient.  Bennett, 377 A.2d at 59-60.  
Nondisclosure may also constitute fraud, but only when there is a duty to speak. 
Loughlin v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 2d 165, 173 (D.D.C. 2002) (vacated on other
grounds) (citing Kapiloff v. Abington Plaza Corp., 59 A.2d 516, 517 (D.C. 1948)).  Such
6a duty arises when a partial disclosure is misleading, or if a confidential or fiduciary
relationship exists.  Kapiloff, 59 A.2d at 518.  In Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v.
Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 878 A.2d 1226, 1232 (D.C. 2005), a case the
District Court found particularly persuasive, plaintiffs alleged common law fraud against
their benefits administrator based upon misrepresentations about their health coverage. 
Prior to applying for coverage under the plan, plaintiffs received a benefits booklet
containing a directory of the panel of mental health providers available in the network,
but were not told that there was a plan to cut reimbursement rates to providers by 30-
40%, which resulted in 10% of the providers leaving the network.  Plaintiffs alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the administrator for failure to inform
providers of the upcoming rate cut.  
The Virginia Academy court held that the booklet contained no obligation or
implied promise to provide a particular panel of a particular size, and that it included a
disclaimer as to its currency.  The administrator was aware that the cut in reimbursement
rates would have a marked negative consequence on the provider panel, that “it was going
to be a shock for providers,” and that there would be “a lot of clean-up work to do.”  Id. at
1237 n.15.  This awareness, however, could not reasonably be found “to have mandated
disclosure of that information to [plaintiffs] in particular so as to be deemed to have
engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation.”  Id. at 1237.  The composition and size of the
provider panel, the court concluded, had not “so markedly change[d] that a breach of
contract could fairly be inferred . . . .”  Id.
7Alvarez claims that INA’s representations that the policy was “Guaranteed
Renewable” for life, that premiums “may” change, and that the premiums had been
expertly priced, were “half-truths” and misleading because they did not tell the whole
story, namely, that the policy was actuarially unsound and that the premiums would
increase.  Neither the policy nor the promotional materials contained any false or
misleading representations, and INA did not have any duty to disclose the possibility of
future premium increases or the underlying actuarial assumptions for that possibility.  
For one thing, the policy explicitly reserved the right to raise premiums at any time
after payment of the first premium.  In the same way that the benefits booklet in Virginia
Academy did not guarantee the size of the provider panel and thus no such promise could
be implied, no representation was made that the right to raise premiums would not be
exercised or that there was no plan to do so in the future.  Moreover, the only limitation
on that right was that premiums must be raised on a class, not an individual, basis, and
that they could not be raised until after payment of the first premium.  Even if INA knew
that premiums would increase, the policy explicitly authorized such an increase and
Alvarez cannot seriously claim to have been misled into believing that that would never
happen. 
Second, contrary to Alvarez’s interpretation, the policy was guaranteed renewable,
not guaranteed affordable.  The guaranteed renewable clause meant that INA could not
cancel a member’s policy unilaterally for any reason, unless the member failed to pay the
premium.  This guaranteed the right to renew the policy, not the financial ability to renew
  Although the promotional materials stated that INA was rated “‘A’ (Excellent)”, this6
was an apparently accurate statement of the current rating at that time, and a description
of what the A.M. Best rating measured.
8
the policy, and did not imply that premiums would never increase, or that they would
only increase by a limited, affordable amount. 
Finally, neither the policy nor the promotional materials represented or implied
that expert actuaries calculated the premiums, nor did they contain representations
regarding the underlying methodology for calculating premiums.  The policy merely
stated that “[r]ates are based on attained age on date of issue and this base does not
change with age.”  Similarly, the policy did not contain any representations, either
explicit or implicit, regarding the financial soundness of the calculations, or future
projections for premium calculations.6
But even if there was a misrepresentation, and we emphasize that we see none,
Alvarez has not shown that he relied on any such misrepresentation.  To establish
reliance, he was required to show that the representation played a substantial part, and
therefore was a substantial factor, in influencing his decision.  Va. Acad. of Clinical
Psychologists, 878 A.2d at 1238.  All Alvarez offers is his statement that he would not
have purchased the policy had he known about the future premium increases.  We have
difficulty understanding how he can claim to have relied on a provision that explicitly
allows such increases to believe that premiums would never increase. 
9To succeed in a constructive fraud claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
confidential relationship exists between the parties.  Witherspoon v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
964 F. Supp. 455, 461 (D.D.C. 1997).  A confidential relationship is characterized as one
where one party is able to “exercise extraordinary influence over the other.”  Id.   Alvarez
argues that there is a confidential relationship between an insurance company and its
insured such that there is a duty on the part of the insurance company to disclose all
material facts, and cites Messina v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 2 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (per curiam).  Alvarez’s reliance on Messina is misplaced.  Messina dealt with a
bad faith denial of an insurance claim where, by definition, the parties were in a
contractual relationship unlike here where Alvarez’s claim is that he was defrauded prior
to the time that there was a contractual relationship, i.e. he claims that he was fraudulently
induced to enter into that relationship.  There was simply no confidential relationship at
the time of the allegedly inducing conduct and, in the absence of a confidential
relationship, the constructive fraud claim must fail.  
Alvarez’s DCCPPA claim fails for the same reason that his fraud claim failed, i.e.
he has not shown any false representation by INA.  
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the December 12, 2006 order of the
District Court.  
